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End-of-life organ donation is controversial in Islam. The controversy stems from: (1) scientifically flawed medical
criteria of death determination; (2) invasive perimortem procedures for preserving transplantable organs; and (3)
incomplete disclosure of information to consenting donors and families. Data from a survey of Muslims residing in
Western countries have shown that the interpretation of religious scriptures and advice of faith leaders were major
barriers to willingness for organ donation. Transplant advocates have proposed corrective interventions: (1)
reinterpreting religious scriptures, (2) reeducating faith leaders, and (3) utilizing media campaigns to overcome
religious barriers in Muslim communities. This proposal disregards the intensifying scientific, legal, and ethical
controversies in Western societies about the medical criteria of death determination in donors. It would also violate
the dignity and inviolability of human life which are pertinent values incorporated in the Islamic moral code.
Reinterpreting religious scriptures to serve the utilitarian objectives of a controversial end-of-life practice, perceived
to be socially desirable, transgresses the Islamic moral code. It may also have deleterious practical consequences, as
donors can suffer harm before death. The negative normative consequences of utilitarian secular moral reasoning
reset the Islamic moral code upholding the sanctity and dignity of human life.
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Scientific and scholarly debates about defining death for
organ procurement purposes have intensified [1]. The
current legal definition requires the irreversible cessation
of all functions of the entire brain or the irreversible
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions [1].
All Abrahamic faith traditions (Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam) have expressed support for this definition of
death, assuming it is supported by scientific evidence [2].
If truly death has occurred, then current timing of organ
procurement is appropriate and permissible (ie, organ
procurement “ex cadavere”) [3]. However, the medical
literature is unsettled about the brain and circulatory
criteria of death determination [1,4-8]. Permanent uncon-
sciousness and cessation of brainstem reflexes (including
apnea) constitute the brain criterion of death, while the* Correspondence: rady.mohamed@mayo.edu
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumcirculatory criterion is determined by 2 to 5 minutes of
absent arterial pulse [1]. Ambiguities in the definition
and criteria of death have compelled scholars to re-
address the moral permissibility of organ donation in
Abrahamic religions [2,9-12].
End-of-life organ donation remains controversial in
Islam [2,13]. This controversy emanates from: (1) scien-
tifically ambiguous medical criteria of death determin-
ation [4-8,14,15]; (2) invasive perimortem procedures
for preserving transplantable organs [13,16,17]; and (3)
incomplete disclosure of information to consenting
donors and families [4,8,18,19]. We have summarized
elsewhere the scientific evidence challenging the validity
of the 2 alternative criteria of death and recommended
that the medical criteria of death should be restored to
reflect the singularity of death as a biological phenomenon
[20]. We also outlined examples of utilitarian practices inentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
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values and traditional rituals in dying Muslim patients
[13,20]. Here, we limit the term “utilitarianism” to mean
“persons are used in the same way as things are used” [21].
Sharif et al. described factors influencing the willing-
ness toward organ donation in an international quanti-
tative survey of Muslims (n = 675) “residing in Western
countries (United Kingdom, Europe, North America,
and Oceanic geography)”: “[t]he main constraints cited by
Western Muslims were interpretation of religious scrip-
tures [the Quran and the Hadith] (76.5%) and advice from
local mosque (70.2%)” [22].
Gauher et al. [23] also commented on the significance
of religious and cultural barriers to organ donation
among UK Muslims. Transplant advocates [22-29] have
proposed corrective interventions: (1) reinterpreting reli-
gious scriptures, (2) reeducating faith leaders, and (3)
utilizing media campaigns to overcome religious barriers
to organ donation in Muslim communities. Several com-
mentators in Western countries have indeed attempted
to reinterpret the Islamic moral code [30-33]. In this
article, we focus on: (1) the phenomena of life and death
within religious scriptures, (2) the utilitarian interpre-
tations of the moral code in end-of-life organ donation,
(3) the societal consequences of such challengeable
interpretations, and (4) the targeting of faith leaders
with reeducation campaigns promoting these interpre-
tations in Muslim communities.Figure 1 Human death is a singular phenomenon. “Human death is a s
There is a gradual loss of capacity for somatic integration of the whole bod
functions including circulation, respiration (controlled by the brainstem), an
respiratory functions is interlinked to the onset of whole brain necrosis. The
the whole brain, including the brainstem, is complete” [37]. Disintegration
clinical test to ascertain the absence of self and/or environmental awarene
neurological and circulatory criteria redefining human death enable heart-b
respectively. Scientifically flawed criteria of death can harm donors because
Figure reproduced from source [37], under the terms of the Creative CommThe natural phenomena of life and death within religious
scriptures
The Quran and the Sunnah are the 2 primary sources of
religious teachings and knowledge in Islam [13,34]. The
Quran has described the “natural” phenomena of both
life and death 14 centuries ago. However, because of a
limited capacity to fully comprehend the Quranic verses
on these phenomena, scholars continue to be challenged
in understanding these descriptions. For example, the
Quran describes human development through the early
stages of life [35]. Medical embryology has clarified
different embryonal and fetal stages of development.
Similarly, the Quran also describes the dying process
and transition from life to death. The Quran differenti-
ates between the dying process and death:
“Then why do you not (intervene) when (the soul of a
dying person) reaches the throat? (83) And you at the
moment are looking on, (84) But We (i.e. Our angels
who take the soul) are nearer to him than you, but
you see not (85)” (56: 83–85) [36].
Advances in resuscitation science appears to corrobor-
ate the Quranic characterization of the dying process.
Different stages in the dying process can be discerned
before death (Figure 1) [37]. The complete loss of vital
organs’ capacity to recover their respective functions
completes the dying process and death follows as a final,ingular phenomenon. The dying process occurs in stages over time.
y because of an irreversible cessation of all vital and biological
d consciousness. The irreversibility of cessation of circulatory and
loss of capacity for consciousness is irreversible when the necrosis of
begins after completion of the dying process. There is no accurate
ss in unresponsive patients following severe brain injuries. Arbitrary
eating and non–heart-beating procurement of transplantable organs,
procurement procedures are performed without general anaesthesia.
ons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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integration at death. The Quran describes the disintegra-
tion process: “Who will give life to these bones after
they are rotten and have become dust?” (36: 78) [36].
To facilitate organ donation and transplantation,
contemporary transplantation practices use 2 types of
death [1]. Death is now determined by either the brain
criterion (ie, brain or neurological death) in heart-
beating organ procurement or the circulatory criterion
(ie, cardiorespiratory death) in non–heart-beating organ
procurement (Figure 1). Scientific evidence has challenged
both criteria of death [1,4-8,14]. Either criterion is
inconsistent with biological death because: (1) donors
determined dead by the neurological criterion can
retain normal coordination of bodily physiological func-
tions and/or critical brain functions that are characteristic
of living human beings, and (2) donors determined dead
by the circulatory criterion can retain viable central brain
pathways and neurological responsiveness [1,4,6,7,15,38].
Currently, there is no accurate clinical test that can ascer-
tain the absence of awareness following severe brain injur-
ies. Advances in neurosciences suggest that the capacity
for consciousness and self-awareness can be retained des-
pite extensive injury to the human brain [39-42]. Donors
retaining viable central neural pathways also may experi-
ence nociception during surgical procedures [1,7,43,44].
Living human beings suffer when surgical procedures are
performed without general anesthesia. The Quran (as do
many scientists and scholars) affirms that death is a singu-
lar event, and therefore applying current medical criteria
of death can inflict harm onto organ donors [13,20].
Utilitarian interpretation of the moral code of Islam in
end-of-life organ donation
Social contexts may be considered in the interpretation of
the Islamic moral code about human acts that are notTable 1 Primary and secondary sources of the Islamic legal an
• Primary sources ○ The Quran: reve
○ The Sunnah: th
what he saw an
• Secondary sources (reinterpretation
of the primary sources)
○ Ijma: consensus
practice (third s
○ Qiyas: juristic re
○ Istishab: the pri
known to be tr
○ Maslaha: the pr
○ Istihsan: the pri
○ Urf: the princip
Table is developed from the source [34]. The primary sources of Islamic law and mo
legal and moral opinions about acts or practices that are not mentioned explicitly i
agree on the Quran, Sunnah and Ijma as sources of Islamic law in that order. The S
instead of Qiyas. Legal and moral opinions or fatwas must uphold the primary obje
mind, property and progeny. The application of secondary sources (eg, maslaha, ist
with an absolute certainty or yaqin in accordance with the Quran and Sunnah.mentioned in the Quran or Sunnah. To ratify a moral and
legal opinion or fatwa about such acts, qualified scholars
apply secondary sources or principles in a process called
ijtihad (Table 1) [34]. There are 2 preconditions for the
validation of an opinion or fatwa: (1) it must not clash
with the Quran and the Sunnah, and (2) it must not harm
the person’s religion, life, mind, property or progeny
(ie, the objectives or maqasid of the Islamic law) [34].
The moral code is intended to protect the inviolability
and the dignity of human life regardless of time and
place. Interpretation of religious scriptures to justify a
medical practice perceived to be socially desirable,
without the prerequisite observance of the objectives of
Islamic law, will transgress the moral code. We contend
that redefining death in end-of-life organ donation is an
example of such misaligned interpretation. For 4 de-
cades, the scientific controversy has continued on death
determination in organ donation [1,4]. A social con-
struct of death may well serve utilitarian objectives in
society, that is, donors are categorized as dead so that
procured organs are transplantable into other living
humans. However, such a utilitarian social construct of
death can harm donors and pose moral challenges to the
transplantation practice [7,38].
The Council of Islamic Jurisprudence accepted brain
death as biological and legal death in 1986 [45]. Since
then, the majority of Islamic institutions and councils
in Western countries have issued legal opinions and
fatwas permitting end-of-life organ donation [46]. How-
ever, these opinions or fatwas are revocable because:
“fatwas are generally acknowledged as fallible opinions
because of the possibility of human misunderstanding,
misinterpretation or lack of knowledge about the pheno
menon which fatwas are addressing” [46]. Indeed, recent
advances in the clinicopathological characterization of
brain death have mandated a critical reappraisal of pastd moral code
lation from God to man (first source of Islamic law)
e tradition of the Prophet Muhammad: what he said, what he did,
d approved during his lifetime (second source of Islamic Law)
agreement about the moral and/or legal assessment of an act or
ource of Islamic law)
asoning by analogy (fourth source of Islamic law)
nciple of presumption in the laws of evidence that a given state of affairs
ue in the past still continues to exist until the contrary is proved
inciple of reasoning based on public welfare and interest
nciple of reasoning based on preference, ie, “seeking to do good”
le of reasoning based on customary practice
ral code are the Quran and Sunnah. Secondary sources can be applied to issue
n the primary sources. This process is called ijtihad. Sunni and Shiite sects
hiite sect considers Aql (human intellect) as the fourth source of Islamic law
ctives or maqasid of Islamic law ie, the protection of a person’s religion, life,
ihsan) in end-of-life organ donation is preconditioned that death is determined
Rady and Verheijde Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2014, 9:11 Page 4 of 9
http://www.peh-med.com/content/9/1/11fatwas [47]. Various Muslim scholars have rejected past
fatwas on brain death because of theological and medical
reasons. Sachedina [48] has commented that brain death
is incompatible with the Quranic description of life and
death. Sarhill et al. [49] have rejected the criterion of
brain death because it is imprecise and contradicts the
Quran and Sunnah. Bedir and Aksoy [50], after analyzing
scholarly Islamic sources, concluded that brain death is
not complete death.
Padela and colleagues [51] reaffirmed the clinical ambi-
guity in brain death determination. In Islam, the criterion
of death must be unequivocal and grounded in robust
evidence so as to uphold the inviolability of human life.
In an address to the Organ Transplantation Congress
in Abu-Dhabi on February 1998, the Muslim scholar
Al-Qaradawi reemphasized that “the legal Islamic opinion
which is in favour of organ donation and organ transplant-
ation, as long as we are sure that all the moral and reli-
gious conditions have been met” [emphasis added] [52].
The Quran describes death as yaqin (Arabic word for ab-
solute certainty), ie, a singular event determined with an
absolute certainty at a specific time: “And worship your
Lord until there comes unto you the certainty (i.e. death)”
(15:99) [36]. If the medical criterion cannot validate death
determination with an absolute certainty, then end-of-life
organ donation transgresses the moral code. Al-zann (ie,
doubt, uncertainty, conjecture, or suspicion) is the oppos-
ite of yaqin and is legally and morally prohibited in death
determination. The Quran warns against al-zann because
it can lead to deviation from the truth: “Certainly, con-
jecture (al-zann) can be of no avail against the truth”
(10:36) [36]. Consequently, acts that are based on
al-zann can have negative consequences: “Avoid much
suspicion (al-zann), indeed some suspicions (al-zann) are
sins” (49:12) [36]. Transplant advocates have accepted
al-zann instead of yaqin in death determination [31-33].
They argue that al-zann al-ghalib (ie, the dominant prob-
ability) is sufficient to justify contemporary practice of
organ procurement in brain death. We think that al-zann
al-ghalib in death determination is a major departure from
the moral code because it is grounded in the faulty
assumption that early stages in the dying process (Figure 1)
are synonymous with death. Medically, the prognosis of
death is mistaken for the diagnosis of death [53,54].
Indeed, Western advocates admit that brain death is a
social construct based on equating human death with the
permanent loss of personhood rather than of biological life
[32,33]. Acceptance of this construct of death conflicts
with the Quranic characterization of death and emphasis
on the sanctity of life. Since yaqin (certainty) is a precon-
dition in death determination, leading Muslim scholars
have rejected the neurological criterion of death [55].
Advocates have also argued that the principles of
maslaha and istihsan can justify end-of-life organdonation [30,31,45,52]. However, if death cannot be deter-
mined with absolute certainty then these principles are
not applicable (Table 1). Maslaha and istihsan can in-
voke intrinsically subjective and challengeable opinions.
In maslaha, saving the lives of persons with end-stage
organ disease is considered important for societal welfare.
However, maslaha cannot justify ending a human life
(donors) prematurely to procure transplantable organs
since this act transgresses the moral code [20]. In istihsan,
(Arabic meaning “seeking to do good”), donating an organ
is giving another person the “gift of life” and is considered
a charitable act. The istihsan is based on the good
intention and goodness of the act of giving the “gift of life”
to another human being. This is also flawed. First, fre-
quently there are alternative medical treatment options
available, although less preferred in society, for saving the
lives of those with end-organ disease [20]. Second, trans-
planted organs are not a permanent cure as manifested by
the immune system’s ultimate rejection in surviving reci-
pients. Surviving recipients are burdened with serious
medical complications that can develop because of anti-
rejection (immunosuppression) medications which can be
life-threatening [56,57]. Third, it can be argued that the
gifting of an organ is counterintuitive to the Islamic belief
in divine creation and personal entrustment of the body.
Other principles such as istishab (presumption of con-
tinuity) also prohibit organ donation in brain death. Badawi
[58] describes this principle “…if it is uncertain if a patient
is dead (however evolving definition of death is accepted),
then continuity of life should be presumed until death
otherwise is confirmed”. It follows that procuring
organs from donors declared dead with a medically am-
biguous criterion is the same as procuring organs from a
living human being. Based on the preponderance of evi-
dence that brain-dead persons retain most of the living
characteristics of human beings, including some brain
functions, the principle of al-zann al-ghalib equally pro-
hibits equating brain death with death. The moral code
mandates yaqin in death determination.
In a joint physician-jurist seminar on brain death and
organ donation held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on 16 April
2012, Kasule [59] reiterated several Islamic legal principles
that may be violated. First, the principle of intention is vio-
lated because “organ harvesting, ICU [intensive care unit]
costs and research have been a driving force behind devel-
opment of brain death criteria” [59]. Second, the pressure
to declare brain death can be “causing potential harm to a
donor to benefit a recipient which would violate the
principle that prevention of harm has precedence over
getting a benefit” [59]. Third, “the principle of certainty:
recognition of death [must] be based on clear evidence…
brain death criteria do not reach the level of absolute
certainty … [in Islamic] Law doubt does not void a cer-
tainty: in this case life is a certainty and brain death is a
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sensus on criteria of death … [must] be by a preponderant
majority of the professionals and not by a minority…
[and] also must have stood the test of time… [brain death]
criteria have been changing with development of know-
ledge and technology and have not reached the level of
universal consensus having variation by country and by in-
stitution” [59]. Fifth, the construct of brain death trans-
gresses the maqasid of Islamic Law ie, “protection of life”
and that “… death should not be declared in a living per-
son without evidence-based certainty…” because “[m]
istaken diagnosis has very severe consequence” [59].
Societal consequences of utilitarian interpretation of the
moral code of Islam
Sharif et al. [22] invoked the principle that necessity
overrides prohibition to ameliorate the negative implica-
tions from ambiguous death determination:
“Although violation of the human body, whether alive
or dead, is forbidden in Islam a greater emphasis is
placed on altruism and humanitarian need. “If
anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life
of the whole people” [36] is a shared principle among
the Abrahamic religions and provides theologic
justification for enacting the Islamic juristic principle
of al-darurat tubih almahzurat or “necessity overrides
prohibition” [Emphasis added].
The implicit argument is that societal needs for organ
transplantation should take priority over the prohibition
of procuring organs from donors who may not be dead
by the biological standard. Khalid and Khalil [60] have
commented “[a] dying person may not need his viable
organs as much as persons on waiting lists, where an
organ transplant could make a difference.” The afore-
mentioned comments can be construed as to mean that
expediting the demise of a dying person to procure
transplantable organs is morally acceptable. This argu-
ment may be acceptable to some people under the con-
ditions that: (1) an open public debate has taken place;
and (2) a broad agreement has been established on
arbitrarily defining death to facilitate organ donation.
Neither condition has been met [4,7,38]. Most in soci-
ety disagree a priori on the permissibility of procuring
organs before biological death. The utilitarian objective
in redefining death for organ donation and transplant-
ation is grounded in the notion that “the end justifies the
means”. However, Islam and other Abrahamic faiths
[2,3,9-11] forbid terminating life for donating transplant-
able organs with no exceptions made for “altruism and
humanitarian need” as suggested by Sharif et al. [22].
The Quran condemns the intentional termination of
human life unjustly: “And whoever commits that throughaggression and injustice, We shall cast him into the Fire”
(4: 30) [36]. Sharif et al. advocated reinterpreting religious
scriptures in favor of donating organs at the end of life
[22]. They advanced the utilitarian reinterpretation of
religious scriptures by citing the Quranic verse that
saving one life is as saving the whole of mankind and,
therefore, organ donation and transplantation is per-
missible [22,25]. However, Sharif et al. cited just a por-
tion of the Quranic verse: “if anyone killed a person —
not in retaliation of murder, or (and) to spread mischief
in the land — it would be as if he killed all mankind,
and if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the
life of all mankind” (5:32) [36]. Although saving one life
is as saving the whole of mankind, the complete verse
ranks condemnation of terminating a human life above
commendation of saving a life [13]. The ranking of
“killing a person” above “saving a life” reaffirms that
preventing evil supersedes promoting good [13].
Sharif et al. proposed interventions that are focused on
“global Muslim populations”, “demographic groups”, and
“influential parties” encouraging positive attitudes to-
ward donation in Muslim communities. In defense of
their effort to increase donation rates, they argued that
their approach could contribute to societal welfare by
preventing “…Western Muslims developing resentment
and temptation into organ trafficking” and “Muslims
becoming a growing burden on dialysis programs” [22].
The authors conflated the secular moral theories of conse-
quentialism, utilitarianism, and autonomy with religion-
based morality. This utilitarian reasoning and concern
with self-serving interests may be discernable in trans-
plantation practice. For instance, Sharif circumvented
the controversy about the definition of death by reassert-
ing the authority of the medical profession in settling
this matter and ignoring (scientific and/or theological)
concerns:
“[t]he major issue that stems from such debate is who
should be deemed the ultimate authority to determine
the eventuality of death—physicians or theologians? It
is clear from this discussion that opposing views on
the subject of brain death criterion can be broadly but
not exclusively categorized into physicians versus
theologians (supporters of a physical vs. philosophical
definition of death, respectively). In Islam, passing of
the body may be different from passing of the soul,
but we can only rely on physical rather than
metaphysical examination to determine the moment
of death. I would argue physicians are the true
determinants of cessation of (physical) life because the
metaphysical is beyond any human assessment” [25].
Sharif disregarded contemporary scientific objections
to the medical criteria of death. He depicted the Quranic
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merely philosophical (metaphysical) and, therefore, phy-
sicians should be the decisive authority in defining death
criteria. The assertion that physicians (more precisely,
the transplantation community) should be customizing
the death criteria, for the goals of the organ transplant-
ation practice, highlights the creep of moral reasoning
toward the duty-to-die and utilitarian medical homicide
[61,62]. Engelhardt [63] has described the rise of secular
moral reasoning in medicine and concluded that it
“results from the death of God and the abandonment of
a God's eye perspective” in “posttraditional Western
societies”. Engelhardt [63] pointed out that controver-
sial end-of-life medical practices have thrived through
“secularizing” morality and dismantling traditional moral
boundaries of Abrahamic faiths. Indeed, the new field of
“Islamic bioethics” appears to be emerging with a focus
on reinterpretation of religious text to accommodate
utilitarian-based objectives in medicine [64]. History
has shown the disastrous consequences of dismantling
traditional moral boundaries under the premise that the
medical profession knows what is best [65,66]. Utili-
tarian medical objectives culminated in extermination
of “vulnerable populations” under the premise of com-
passionate care, relief of human suffering, and societal
welfare [66]. The “moral vulnerabilities” and utilitarian
pressures that previously justified prematurely ending
“life unworthy of life”, are still thriving in “contempor-
ary medical culture” [67]. Hamdy [68] has cautioned
against the slippery slope in utilitarian transplantation
practice by describing an example from Germany:
“…many books were published in Germany voicing
fears and criticism of organ harvesting from brain-
dead patients” because of “haunted memories of state
violence and its link to biomedical practice.” There-
fore, it is surprising that Islamic councils continue to
rely on the premise that “the medical profession is the
proper authority to define the signs of death” [46]
without critically evaluating the scientific validity or
the utilitarian objectives underlying the death criteria.
We have cautioned of the sociocultural consequences
of reinterpreting the moral code to conform to the utili-
tarian ideology of increasing end-of-life organ donation
[13,20]. Critics of this utilitarian ideology are generally
disdained:
“when people in other societies voice antipathy
toward medical procedures like organ procurement,
they explain their own stance in terms of “culture”,
such that similar feelings of antipathy from within the
US dominant culture are rendered imperceptible” [68].
The dominance of utilitarian ideology in Western coun-
tries is evident when Randhawa [69], a member of the UKOrgan Donation Taskforce, rejects the relevance of reli-
gious scriptures because its moral code is dictated by
values that are ancient and irrelevant in modern day prac-
tice of organ transplantation:
“We need to acknowledge that most religious
scriptures were written hundreds, if not thousands of
years ago, before any consideration of organ
transplantation. Consequently, any religious position
on organ donation is subject to a religious scholar’s
interpretation of the scriptures and the values
espoused by the faith.” [Emphasis added].
Theologians would disagree with Randhawa because of
the theological view that religious values of the Abrahamic
faiths are held to originate from one divine source and
apply regardless of time. Along the same line of reasoning,
Moosa has counter-argued theological dissent: “theolo-
gians and pseudo-theologians use science… in order to
prove the validity and the wisdom of their scriptures only
to put on display the ‘truth’ of their respective faiths.…
these pseudo-theologies are embarrassing for both serious
scientists and theologians” [32]. However, it can be argued
that the so-called “serious scientists and theologians”, who
are rejecting the truth and wisdom of the religious scrip-
tures, are imposing their societal ideological preferences
and values over those of others. Padela and Zaganjor have
blamed negative attitudes towards organ donation on
“negative religious coping” as well as an “insecure relation-
ship with God and an ominous view of the world” [70].
Advocates appear to overlook that the Quran is held to
be the ultimate reference in Islam to settle disputes on
the moral boundaries of human behavior: “He sent the
Scripture in truth to judge between people in matters
wherein they differed” (2:213) [36].
In spite of valid scientific and theological objections,
many Sunni and Shiite scholars continue to espouse the
permissibility of end-of-life organ donation [71,72]. One
implication of reinterpreting religious text for the benefit
of a utilitarian transplantation practice is that religion’s
primary value, ie, the sanctity of life and human dignity
is being violated. Incorrect reinterpretation of the moral
code by special interest groups transgresses the religious
rights of Muslim communities and constitutes intellec-
tual violence against religious scholarship. The Quran
cautions against deviant interpretation of the moral
code to appease special interests: “And if the truth had
been in accordance with their desires, verily, the heavens
and the earth, and whosoever is therein would have been
corrupted!” (23:71) [36].
Media campaigns and reeducation of Muslim faith leaders
Sharif et al. [22] conveyed conflicting messages about Islam.
They stated “…poor donation consent among Western
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from interpretation of religious scriptures or advice from
Imam or Mosque” to then attribute this unfavorable
interpretation or advice to “the lack of education and/or
awareness” [22]. Sharif et al. suggested 2 related strat-
egies: reeducating religious leaders and utilizing media
campaigns. For example, Sharif et al. disapproved of 2
religious beliefs prevalent in Muslim communities: (1)
the forbiddance of physically violating the living or de-
ceased human body, and (2) the “fatalist attitudes of
predetermination” prohibiting “human interference to
alter a preordained course of medical events” [22]. They
connoted these 2 religious beliefs that are barriers to
willingness to organ donation as lack of education.
Others would argue these religious beliefs are founded
on: (1) the sanctity of God’s creation of life and human
body, and (2) the divine predetermination, Will and
Decree (Al-Qadaa wa Al-Qadar). The Quran is the source
of these beliefs: “Verily, We have created all things with
Qadar (Divine Preordainments of all things before their
creation, as written in the Book of Decrees)” (54:49) [36].
We have addressed elsewhere how mass media can be
an effective tool of communication to remove religious
barriers toward organ donation [18,73]. For example,
selective disclosure of information in media and educa-
tional campaigns promoting organ donation in Muslim
communities is not novel. Scholarly and scientific de-
bates that are critical about organ donation are gener-
ally excluded from educational and media campaigns.
Yilmaz applied similar strategies to improve willing-
ness to organ donation among Turkish Muslims [24].
He found that religious interpretation of death was the
main reason for refusing organ donation [24]. Yilmaz
applied 2 consecutive interventions in a pilot study of
132 Muslim men so that “…wrong beliefs about organ
donation disappeared”: (1) a one-hour teaching session
on favorable reinterpretation of religious scripture
about death and organ donation; and then (2) a con-
tinuous exposure to favorable public messages about
organ donation in multimedia campaigns (eg, educational
brochures and posters) for a period of 2 months [24]. The
refusal rate of organ donation decreased from 54% at the
beginning of the study to 17% after the completion of the
study [24]. Yilmaz proved that controlling the information
in media campaigns could influence willingness to organ
donation. Yilmaz selectively disclosed information on
“opinion of Supreme Board of Religious Affairs” that was
favorable on brain death and organ donation in his study.
He did not inform the study subjects that Turkish Muslim
scholars [50] have rejected brain death as the Islamic
definition of death. In another Turkish survey in the
province of Kayseri, Guden et al. [29] considered over-
coming the unfavorable attitudes among religious officials
(Imams, muezzins, preachers, and Quran educators)toward organ donation by mischaracterizing scientific
and medical concerns as “social reflex of skeptics”:
“As known, officials of religion preach people and
answer questions from the Islamic point of view and
provide interpretations. People pay attention to these
interpretations from the officials according to their
religious vulnerability and behave accordingly. It is of
utmost importance that officials of religion explain
that their religious reasons opposing organ donation
are not valid, especially to those who are skeptical
about organ donation and show an opposing attitude
as a social reflex but ground it on religious beliefs”
[Emphasis added].
Turkyilmaz et al. [28] proposed a similar strategy of
targeting Muslim religious officials in the Eastern Black
Sea region of Turkey with “appropriate education” to
improve willingness to organ donation. In a subsequent
survey of religious officials, Tarhan et al. reported 92%
had favorable views to organ donation [74]. Nondisclo-
sure of the medical, legal, and religious controversies
about the death criteria and organ donation was a common
theme in public surveys [27-29,71,72,74,75]. Surveyors did
not discern willingness to organ donation if the death
criteria were inconsistent with the Islamic moral code.
Dissemination of incomplete information violates the eth-
ical principles of transparency and truthfulness in medicine
and denies individuals the right to informed decision mak-
ing. It is not surprising that almost 24% of US physicians
object to donation because of concerns about the quality
of end-of-life care and the invasiveness of perimortem
procedures associated with organ procurement [76]. We
recommend that medical information about how death is
determined and the surgical procedures that are performed
for organ procurement should be communicated clearly
and explicitly to the general public in media campaigns and
opinion surveys. Attempting to influence behavior and
attitudes through disclosing incomplete information or
communicating incorrect interpretations contradicts the
Islamic moral virtues of truthfulness and honesty.
Conclusions
Proposals by organ transplantation advocates to promote
organ donation in Muslim communities disregard the
appropriate application of Islamic jurisprudence and
the growing scientific and theological controversies in
Western societies about death determination. Utilitarian
reinterpretation of the religious scriptures for the purpose
of embracing a controversial end-of-life practice, perceived
to be socially desirable, has deleterious practical conse-
quences: (1) donors can suffer harm; and (2) utilitarian
secular moral reasoning resets the Islamic moral code that
uphold the sanctity and dignity of human life.
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